Disposition of the Insane Defendant after Acquittal--The Long Road from Commitment to Release by Greenwald, Robert
 
Disposition of the Insane Defendant after Acquittal--The Long Road
from Commitment to Release
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Robert Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant after
Acquittal--The Long Road from Commitment to Release, 59 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 583 (1969).
Published Version http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol59/iss4/11/
Accessed February 16, 2015 6:36:22 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12964427
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAJournal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 59|Issue 4 Article 11
1969
Disposition of the Insane Defendant after
Acquittal--The Long Road from Commitment to
Release
Robert Greenwald
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of theCriminal Law Commons,Criminology Commons, and theCriminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant after Acquittal--The Long Road from Commitment to Release, 59 J. Crim. L.
Criminology & Police Sci. 583 (1968)THE ACQUITTED INSANE DEFENDANT
DISPOSITION  OF  THE INSANE  DEFENDANT  AFTER "ACQUITTAL"-THE
LONG  ROAD  FROM  COMMITMENT  TO  RELEASE
ROBERT  GREENWALD
This comment traces  the legal  accommodations
made for disposition of the insane defendant after
his  acquittal  by  reason  of  insanity.  The  main
emphasis will be on the competing policies of public
safety  and treatment  of the  "patient,"  and how
these conflicting  purposes  hamper  the  insane  de-
fendant's  chances for  a timely release.  A growing
disenchantment with the insanity  "defense"  itself
can be traced, in part, to the haunting spectre of
indeterminate  detention.
Criminal  defendants who  are  acquitted  on  the
grounds  of insanity'  are nearly  always committed
to mental institutions. At common law, the courts
possessed  the  power  to  order  immediate  confine-
ment, and many defendants were sent to jail.2 The
common  law  has  been  superseded  in  almost  all
jurisdictions  by  statutes  which  provide  for  the
defendant's  civil  commitment  as  an insane  per-
son.
3
A finding  of insanity at the time  of the offense,
"relieves  the offending  actor of criminal  responsi-
bility." 
4  This means that "insanity"  is a defense
to the crime even though the material elements -of
the offense have  been established.
5  However,  un-
I "Insanity" is now considered a legal concept,  not a
medical  diagnosis.  OVEaOLSER,  THE  PsYcMATsT
AND  =EE LAW  61  (1953);  Dession,  The Mentally Ill
Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,
53  YALE L. J. 684, 686 (1944). The ambiguity between
its consideration as a medical term and a legal concept
has  created  demands  for  the  term's  abandonment.
See e.g.,  WEmOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER  AS  A CRIIIINAL
DEFENSE 5  (1954).
'See  United States v. Lawrence, 4 Cranch C.C.  518,
26  Fed.  Cas. No.  15,  577  (1835);  Commonwealth  v.
Meriam, 7 Mass.  168  (1810).
3Tennessee  and  the  federal  government  have  no
legislation  to deal with a jury acquittal  by reason  of
insanity.  See  the  statutory  summary  in  Lynch  v.
Overholser,  369  U.S.  724f.  (1962)  (concurring  opinion
by  Clark, J.). See generally Note, Compulsory Commit-
ment  Following  a  Successful  Insanity  Defense,  56
N.W.U.L.Rev.  409  (1961);  A.L.I.,  MODEL  PENAL
CODE  § 4.03  (Proposed  Official  Draft, 1962);  Annot.,
95 A.L.R.2d 54  (1964).  See also Note, Federal Commit-
ment of  Defendants Found Not  Guilty By  Reason  of
Insanity-roposed Legislation, 52  IowA L. Rav.  930
(1967)  for  a  recent  discussion  of proposals  for giving
federal courts statutory authority in this area.
4Daniel  M'Naghten's  Case,  4  St.Tr.N.S.  847,  8
Eng. Rep.  718  (H.L.  1843).  See generally, DONNELLY,
GoLmsEnm,  &  ScHwARTz,  CmRnsAL  LAW  733-844
(1962).
Slnsanity is  a defense  to be asserted  at the trial
as any other  defense,  ... "  People  v. Heirens,  4 Ill.2d
like defenses such as self-defense and entrapment,
which  define  exceptions  to  criminal liability,  the
defense of insanity "defines for confinement an ex-
ception  from among  those who  would  be free of
liability."  I  Criminal  processes  have  used the in-
sanity defense to sanction
7 the "insane"  who would
be excluded from liability by application of general
principles of criminal  law. 8 Insanity has  therefore
become a defense in name only. In virtually every
state, a successful insanity defense  does not bring
freedom with it but triggers potentially indetermi-
nate detention.
Post-trial  commitment  procedures,  whether
mandatory
9  or  discretionary,
1 0  are  premised  on
131,  142,  122  N.E.  2d  231,  238  (1954).  But see the
acknowledgement,  either  intentionally  or  mistakenly,
that  insanity is  evidence  for  determining a  material
element  of each  offense, in United  States  v.  Currens,
290 F.2d 751,  761  (3rd Cir. 1961) and Tatum v. United
States,  190 F.2d  615  (D.C. Cir.  1951).  See generally,
Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense--Why
Not?, 72  YALE L.J. 853  (1963).
6  Goldstein and Katz, supra  note 5, at 855. Consider
the near  acknowledgement  of this  purpose in United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d at 767 (1961): "The throw-
ing of  the mentally  ill individual  from  the  jail  back
into the community,  untreated and uncured,  presents
a  great  and  immediate  danger."  See  also  SIEvING,
MENTAL INcAPACrY IN  CRIMfNAIA  LAW 2 (1961).
7  By  "sanction"  is  meant  any  disposition  of  the
defendant which deprives the defendant of his freedom
involuntarily.
s The  function  of  the  defense  is  not  to  absolve  of
criminal responsibility 'sick'  persons who  would other-
wise be  subject to  criminal  sanction  but to  authorize
the state to  hold those found  not to possess the mens
rea necessary for criminal liability.
9  E.g., CoLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4 (Supp. 1957);
GA.  CODE ANN.  § 27-503  (1953); KAN.  GEn.STAT.ANN.
§  62-1532  (1949);  MAss.  ANN.  LAws  ch.123,  §  101
(1957);  MArNE PuB.  L., ch.  310  (1961):  Mlca.  STAT.
ANN.  § 28.933(3)  (1954);  MiNN.  STAT.ANN.  § 631.19
(Supp.  1957);  NEB.REv.STAT.ANN.  § 29.2203  (1943);
N.Y.Sess.Laws  ch.550,  § 1,  2,  3,  (1960);  Omo Rxv.
CODE  §  2945.39  (Baldwin  1953);  Wis.STAT.  § 957.11
(1955). For a complete list of the statutes and citations,
see  WEmHOFEN,  MENTAL  DisoDER  AS  A  CmnlNAL
DEFENS  365  et seq.  (1954)  and references  cited supra
note 3.
0 In  discretionary  commitment  jurisdictions,  the
prosecutor will consider whether to begin civil commit-
ment proceedings  on  the basis  of a  determination  of
present mental condition by  (1)  either judge or jury
at the present trial;  (2)  by the same judge or jury at a
separate hearing;  (3) by a different jury or judge;  (4)
by a civil  commitment  proceeding.  Note,  Compulsory
Commitment Following a Successful  Insanity Defense,
56 N.W.U.L.REv.  409, 416 (1961).
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the  assumption  that a successful  insanity  defense
has  established  something  about  the  defendant
which  necessitates  that he be kept in custody for
some  indefinite  period.  In  practical  terms,  this
implies  the  crime,  and  not  merely  "insanity"  at
the time of the act, had been  proved against him.
Furthermore, he is treated as if insane at the time
of the trial. These  assumptions pose difficult prob-
lems for legal theory. For one thing, there is usually
no explicit finding by the jury that the defendant
would  have  been  guilty of  the  crime  but for  his
mental  condition."  Further,  since  the jury's  ver-
dict is not a finding  of insanity at the time of the
trial" but only at the time of the crime
3 (or, as in
some jurisdictions, that there is a reasonable doubt
on  the  question)
4,  the  defendant  is  committed
without a determination of his present mental con-
dition."
8
JUSTIFICATIONS
Commitment of a person acquitted by reason of
insanity who may be presently sane has been justi-
fied on several grounds. One is that by pleading not
guilty  by  reason  of  insanity  the  defendant  has
voluntarily  accepted  his  commitment  by  raising
the  defense.
16 This  rationale  forces  the  defendant
1 Note that  the District  of  Columbia  courts  have
held that an acquittal by reason of insanity carries with
it  the  implicit  finding  that, the  question  of  insanity
apart, the defendant was guilty as charged. Ragsdale v.
Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
12 Accord,  WEiEOPEN, supra note  1, at 366;  Note,
Releasing Criminal  Defendants Acquitted and Committed
Because of Insanity: Tit  Need for Balanced Administra-
tion, 68  YAIE L.J. 293.
13  State v. Lafosse, 142 La. 278, 76 So. 713  (1917).
14  Isaac v.  United  States,  284  F.2d  168  (D.C.  Cir.
1960);  Douglas  v.  United States,  239  F.2d  52  (D.C.
Cir.  1956).
sThere is  considerable  difference  of  opinion as  to
the  constitutionality  of  statutes  providing  that  a
person acquitted  by reason of his insanity at the  time
of the offense  may be, without any further hearing on
the  question  of his  present  insanity,  committed  to  a
place  of confinement.  The weight  of authority  is that
such statutes do not deny to the defendant due process
of law. See e.g., Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492
(1912),  Ex parte Slayback,  207  Cal.  480,  288  P. 769
(1930).  Contra, Brown v. Urguhart,  139  F. 846  (D.C.
Wash. 1905); Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 101 N.E. 6
(1913);  Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 20 Am. Rep.
633  (1875). The due process arguments were recognized
in Barry  v. Hall,  98  F.2d  222,225  (D.C. Cir.  1938):
Confinement in a mental hospital is as full and effective
a  deprivation  of personal liberty  as  is confinement  in
jail..  . Due process  of law  does not necessarily  mean
a judicial proceeding-the procedure may be adopted to
the  nature  of  the  case--but  it  does  necessitate  an
opportunity for a hearing and a defense. See also Bauer
v. Acheson,  106 F. Supp. 445, 451  (D.D.C.  1952).
16 Goldstein  and  Katz,  Dangerousness and Mental
Illness: Somne  Observations on  the Decision to  Release
to  choose between  standing  trial for  a crime  for
which he cannot be punished or subjecting himself
to  commitment  procedures.  Defense  counsel  is
then forced to  compare the consequences  of crim-
inality with those of insanity in relation to length
of  confinement.  Possibly,  defense  counsel  would
not assert the insanity defense if this would result
in commitment for a wholly indeterminate  time."
A second  common support for mandatory  com-
mitment  rests  on  a  presumption  of  continuing
insanity which  links the jury's verdict of insanity
at the time of the offense with the mental condition
of the accused at the time the court commits him.
8
One  justification  for  this  presumption  is  that it
would be "impossible  to require a hearing  de novo
everytime  that a return  to sanity  is  claimed."  19
Moreover,  the presumption  is  only for  "continu-
ing"  insanity  over  a  reasonable  period  of  time'
0
and  is rebuttable  by proof  that the  defendant's
insanity was  of the sort which is unlikely to have
continued.n  The burden of proof on these  two is-
sues is on the party raising them at trial.2
The  most  common  rationale  for  commitment
upon "acquittal"  is that the insanity defense is  a
privilege  which  society  awards  to  excuse  an  in-
dividual from the consequences of his criminal act.
After an acquittal by reason of insanity, the offen-
der  is  still  regarded  as mentally  ill and one  over
whom control should be exerted for the protection
of the public.  This consideration  allows  the state
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YATX  L.J.
225,  238  (1960).  People ex rel Peabody v. Chanler,  133
App.  Div.  159,  162,  117  N.Y.Supp.  322,  324  (1909).
Contra,  In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415,  48 S.E. 789  (1904).
"7  See  discussion  of  possible  alternatives  open  to
defense counsel in text notes 91-102.
8 In  re Brown,  39 Wash.  160,  162,  81  P. 552,  554
(1905),  considered  such  a presumption  immune  from
constitutional  attack:  ...  the  solemn  verdict  of  a
jury after due trial establishes that he was insane when
the  killing  occurred.  The  record  ...  shows  that  the
character of insanity considered was not of a temporary
sort ...  the  presumption  being  that  general  insanity
once  shown,  continues,  . . .the  burden  of  proof  to
establish an interval rests upon the party who asserts it.
9  Note, Compulsory Commitment Following  a Success-
ful Insanity Defense, 56 N.W.U.L.REv. 409, 423  (1961).
20 In Hempton v. State, 111  Wis. 127,  130,  86 N.W.
596, 599  (1901)  where  two years  has elapsed  between
the commission of  the act and the  raising  of the pre-
sumption,  the  court  held  that  the presumption  "had
long ceased to exist."
2  Yankulov. v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497,  502, 77
N.E. 2d 88, 92 (1945).  See criticism of the presumption
in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 431  (1869).
"See  In re Brown,  39 Wash.  160,  81 P. 552  (1905)
and supra note  18.  A third justification for mandatory
commitment  is  that the  legislature  might consider  it
appropriate  to  provide  commitment  in  order  to  dis-
courage false pleas of insanity.
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to commit the defendant with little or no adjudica-
tion of his present  mental condition.u  However,
central to this rationale, unlike that corresponding
to other rationales for commitment, is treatment-
not mere confinement-for the defendant. Release
will  come as soon as  the defendant may safely be
at large.24
CONFmINEMENT  AND  TREATmENT  OF  THE  INSANE
DEFENDANT  AFTER  ACQUITTAL
Most  states  provide  for commitment  to state
hospitals or state prisons.2 5  As Dr. Szasz says, "Yet
it  is doubtful  whether  the  distinction  implicit in
this  terminology is anything  more  than  an intel-
lectual and semantic hoax. For what is a 'hospital'
to which one is committed against one's will if not
a  'jail'?"  26  Some  psychiatrists  even  recommend
against  commiting  or  transferring  the criminally
insane to hospitals because  "....  the prison itself is
a satisfactory place for treating most cases."  27
The latter view is challenged  by  some psychia-
tristsn who feel that prisons tend to ignore the psy-
chiatric  problems  of  the  mentally  ill. 2  Perhaps
because of these opposing  views, some states have
statutes  providing  a  discretionary  power  in  the
trial judge  to  commit the  "acquitted"  defendant
to either the state hospital 0  or the state prison."
2Supra,  notes 15 and 19. 24  H. R. REP. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1955).
25  majority of states  confine the criminally  insane
in a  separate  ward  or unit  in  the state hospital.  In
some states, they are kept in a ward in the penal institu-
tion.  Several  states have separate  institutions for the
"criminal insane."  E.g.: Utah state prison has a mental
health service unit to  diagnose and  treat acutely dis-
turbed inmates. Half of the state hospitals have security
"escape-proof"  wards.  Colorado  [Coio.  REv.  STAT.
§ 71-2-4 (1953)] and Nevada [NEv.REv.STAT.  § 433,  310
(1958)]  permit transfer of especially dangerous patients
to the prison, but both states provide that the patient
be visited  by his psychiatrist at regular  intervals.  On
prisons outstripping hospitals as therapeutic  communi-
ties, see  Diamond,  Criminal  Responsibility of the Men-
tally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv.  59 (1961).
26  Szasz,  Psychiatry, Ethics and the  Criminal Law,
58 CoLiB.L.REv. 183,  196  (1961).
2  Eaton,  A  Psychiatrist Views  Rehabilitation of the
Criminal Who is Mentally Ill, 4 KAX.L.REv.  356, 358
(1956). 2
3  Satten, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychiatry
and its Relationship to the Legal Problems of "Criminat
Responsibility", 4 KAN.  L.  REv.  361,  366  (1956)  see
also, Magleby, Should the Criminally  Insane be Housed
in Prisons,  47 J. Cm.  L. C. & P.S.  677 (1957).
29  "But  there has  been  little  effort  in the prisons,
except in the state hospitals for  the criminally insane,
to utilize any of the various organic therapies  that are
available,"  Glueck,  Change Concept in Forensic Psy-
chiatry, 45 J. Camn.  L. C.  & P.S. 123,  132  (1954).
30 The case for placing the criminally insane in hospi-
tals rather than in prison has been most forcefully stated
The trial judge looks at the mental illness, its type,
its severity, or its curability to determine the place
of confinement.
Most state hospitals to which  the defendant has
been  committed  subject  the patient  immediately
to  treatment as well  as  observation.1 2 Yet all  the
criminally  insane are not curable. Indefinite  com-
mitment for them may mean commitment for life.
Public protection  against  the potential  danger  of
the patient can be shaky justification for depriving
by  judge  Holtzoff:  To  incarcerate  such  persons  in
prisons  would  be  inhumane.  Moreover,  it  would  be
unfair  to  other  prisoners,  a  vast  majority  of  whom
necessarily  are sane human beings. On the other hand,
to turn insane  criminals free would be dangerous  both
to the public and to  themselves. For the protection of
the  public  as well  as  for  their  own  protection,  they
should  be  confined  and  treated  in  mental  hospitals.
In  re Rosenfield,  157  F. Supp.  18,  19  (D.D.C.  1957).
It  is treatment and public protection-not punishment
-which  is desired: It is true that she is deprived of her
liberty  temporarily, but not every deprivation of one's
liberty can be considered as an imprisonment for crime.
It  often becomes necessary to  take into custody those
who  are mentally afflicted and detain them until they
become no longer a menace to the public nor dangerous
to themselves.  Ex parte Slayback,  209  Cal. 480,  490,
288 Pac. 769,  773  (1930).  One court has even suggested
that there exists a right to  treatment.  Rouse v. Cam-
eron,  373  F.2d 451  (D.C.  Cir.  1966);  cf.  Donnell  v.
Cameron, 348 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir. 1956)  which suggests
that  commitment  for  four  years  without  treatment "may  be"  unlawful;  Sas v.  Maryland,  334 F.2d  506
(4th Cir.  1964).  See generally Birnbaum,  The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
"1  N.H.REv.STAT.  ch.  607:3  (supp.  1966);  VT.STAT.
ANN.  tit. 13,  § 4805 (1964).  These statutes  allow com-
mitment to  "some  suitable place."  See State v. John-
son, 96 N.H. 4, 69 A.2d 515  (1949)  where this power of
discretion was upheld.
2See supra  note 30. A corollary to the state's provid-
ing treatment  is  the  question  of whether  the patient
can  be forced  to submit  to treatment.  Some doctors
insist that coercion has no place in medicine: We are...
primarily  doctors and not jailors. We are not prepared
to treat  individuals,  against  their will,  for  conditions
which they themselves may not want to get rid of. The
authority  to  detain  individuals  indefinitely,  pending
their  willingness  to  accept  treatment  and  carry  it
through  successfully,  has not been clearly  assigned to
us,  nor would we be eager  to accept  it if it were.  As
therapists we are not put in an untenable position  if a
patient is compelled by us to remain our prisoner until
he  accepts  and  successfully  utilizes  our  therapeutic
offerings.  Menninger,  Book  Review,  38  IowA  L. REv.
697,  701-702  (1953).  Others  frankly  admit that  the
"criminally  insane"  must  be persuaded  to  undergo
therapy:  MACDONAw,  PSYCHiATRY  AND Tax  CanmAL
205  (1958);  Satten,  The  Concept of Responsibility in
Psychiatry and its Relationship to the Legal Problems of
"Criminal Responsibility", 4  KAN.L.REv.  361  (1956).
The statutory authority for medical  treatment  is not
clear in all  states.  See e.g.,  COaN.G~n.STAT.  § 17-194
(1958)  which speaks only of transfer  ". . . to  be  safely
kept...", VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit. 13,  § 4803  (1959)  where
the  court  is  authorized  only to commit  such  persons
"...  to be detained and observed."ROBERT GREENWALD
a man of liberty when it is realized  that even psy-
chiatrists have  grave doubts about treatment and
cure. Moreover, the need to choose  between treat-
ing  and curing on the  one hand,  and keeping the
patient securely locked up on the other, inevitably
detracts  from  the  therapeutic  aspect  of  the  de-
fendant's  commitment.  The  measures  taken  to
insure security are inherently inimical to treatment.
The time, money, skill, and interest which could be
used for rehabilitation are never fully exploited for
that purpose. The mental hospital  could ill afford
the public alarm caused by the escape of an insane
killer  or rapist.  The institutional  commitment  of
the  criminally  insane becomes  tantamount  to  an
elaborate mask for preventive detention.n
THE  PROBLEM  OF  RELEASE
This latter appraisal concerning  the  disposition
of  the  insane  defendant  becomes  more  apparent
as the accommodations  made for  the patient's re-
lease  are  viewed.  Some  defendants  committed  to
mental hospitals under mandatory or discretionary
commitment  statutes  may  qualify  for  release  al-
most at  once.  Such  would  be  the case  where  the
presumption  of continuing insanity is rebutted by
the  "reasonable  time"  requirement.  Others  may
enter a mental hospital for treatment and become
candidates  for release  soon  thereafter.  Still  others
may find  institutional commitment indeterminate.
It  is  on  this last group that  our attention  will be
focused.
In  general,  when  a person  committed as  insane
recovers his sanity, further commitment is illegal,
and he may obtain his release by habeas corpus.H
In  about  half  the states,  the  power  to  discharge
such  persons  is vested  in  the  court  that  ordered
commitment,  or in some other court."
5  A jury trial
33See  generally Goffman,  On  the  Characteristics  of
Total Instimtions, in  WALTER  REED Anmy  INSTITUTE
oF  RESEARCH,  PROCEEDINGS  Or  THE  SYMFOSim  oN
PREVENTIVE  AND  SocIAL  PSYCHIATRY
The  usual  provisions  for  release  are  described  in
WEIHOEN,  MENTAL  DISORDER  AS  A  CRmIMNAL  DE-
FENSE,  376  (1954);  LnmM  Am  McINTYRE,  Tim
MENTALLY  DISABLED  AND  THE  LAw  353  (1961).  In
most  states,  some  form  of  court  approval  must  be
obtained.  This may be  preceded by a certificate from
the  hospital  authority,  or  by  patient's  petition.  A
board of  experts is  sometimes  allowed  to  examine the
mental condition of the patient before allowing release.
See also that in Michigan  and  Massachusetts,  persons
acquitted  of  murder  by  reason  of  insanity  are  com-
mitted for life subject  to discharge only by the governor
and a finding of nondangerousness.  MASS.  ANN. LAWS.
ch.  123  § 101  (1942);  MICH.  Coin'.  LAWS.,  § 766.15c
(1948).
, The superintendent  was required  to  give notice to
"the  court  from which  the commitment  order issued"
is required  in  some  states.
3 6  In seven  states,  the
court  may act  only after  the hospital authorities
have  certified  that the person  has  recoveredY  A
few states expressly permit the hospital authorities
to  discharge  a  person  committed  after  acquittal
without requiring any court order.3  In others the
statutes are silent and it is implied that such per-
sons  may  be  discharged  like  any  other  patient,
which  will  mean  the  hospital  administrator  has
sole discretion.
3 9
Even  though  the  hospital  may  fail  to  certify
that a patient  has  recovered,  almost every juris-
diction allows the patient to initiate habeas corpus
proceedings  to  get  a  court  determination  on  his
right to be discharged.  (As noted above,  restraint
after recovery is illegal, and the patient is entitled
"to  sue out a writ of habeas corpus.")  Ten states
make the writ expressly  available to persons  com-
mitted  after  acquittal  by  reason  of  insanity,0
while  several  other  states  provide  a  statutory
procedure  which  must  be  exhausted  before  the
writ of habeas corpus  can be  used."  Nonetheless,
due process has  been held  to require some  means
for  obtaining  a  judicial  hearing  on  a  patient's
contention  that  he  is  recovered  and  therefore
entitled  to  be  released.  A procedure  that would
abridge this right  and leave  sole discretion in the
hospital  authorities  would  be  unconstitutional.
42
In the majority of  cases relating  to the discharge
of  acquitted  persons  upon  recovery,  there  have
been  specific statutory  provisions  like those men-
tioned  above. The crucial issue in considering  the
problem  of  release  therefore  is  the  criteria-not
the procedure-for determining  "recovery"  of the
patient.
Great  difficulty  arises  in  determining  when  a
in Ex Porte Boehme,  158  Tex. Crim. 278,  255  S.W.2d
206 (1952)  discussed at 32 TEx. L. REv.  124  (1953).
1  Illinois, Texas,  and Washington.
Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas,
Washington, and  West  Virginia.  The constitutionality
of  this  type of  provision  has  been  upheld  in  several
cases,  see  e.g.,  In  re  Clark,  86  Kan.  539,  121  P. 492
(1912);  State  v.  Saffron,  146 Wash.  202,  262  P. 970
(1927).
8  Georgia,  Kansas,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Oklahoma,
and Virginia. 31  Alabama,  Arizona,  Idaho,  Mississippi,  Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,  South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. 4 0 Alabama,  Iowa,  Louisiana,  Maryland,  Michigan,
Nebraska,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  and
Vermont. 4'In  re Ostetter,  103  Kan.  487,  175  P. 377  (1918);
Thompson v. Clifford,  106 Wash.  16,  179 P. 90 (1919).
4  Underwood  v. People,  32  Mich.  1 (1875);  In re
Boyett,  136  N.C. 415,  48  S.E.  789  (1904);  Petition of
Doyle, 16 R.I. 537  (1889).
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patient who has committed  a criminal act has re-
covered sufficiently to be released:
Individuals  who  make good  hospital patients are
sometimes  poor  risks  for  release.  They  may  be-
come adjusted to life inside the hospital and quickly
assume a fixed passive dependence. But adjustment
to the hospital routine gives no assurance that they
would refrain from reestablishing their undesireable
behavior patterns if released.1 3
Moreover,  the public's distaste  for mistakes  in
this field cause hospital authorities  to be very con-
servative  in  their release  practices.  The  only  re-
liable evidence of  "cure"  is the absence of observ-
able symptoms  over a long period  of years.  As  a
result, the tendency  on the part of administrators
is to "play it  safe."  Thus, those who make the final
determination  whether  to  release  or  detain  give
greater  weight to nonmedical  considerations  than
would probably be the case if noncriminal charges
were involved.
The institution  for  confinement  does not have
exclusive power over the issue of release. While re-
lease  is, in  the first instance,  a matter of medical
prognosis,  "the  combined  judgement  of the court
and  the  psychiatrists  on  this  question  is  better
than  either  standing  alone  and  affords  greater
protection to the public."  " Institutional release is
allowed  in  some  states,  but  this  procedure  has
been  objected  to  for  several  reasons.  First,  the
belief  exists  that psychiatrists,  faced  with  over-
crowded facilities,  will release  a man sooner  than
he would  have  been  released  had  he  gone  to
prison."  Second,  dependent  on  public funds,  the
institutional authorities  may  be fearful  of public
reaction  should they make a bad  "guess"  and are
likely  to  retain a patient  for a  longer time  than
necessary.  Also,  many  feel  release  should  not be
left  solely  to  medicine  since  it  is  a  question  of
responsibility  and  thus a  matter  for legal  defini-
tion.
46
43Weihofen,  Treatment  of  Persons  Acquited  by
Insanity, 38  TEx.  L. REv.  849,  864,  (1960).  See  also
Szasz,  Hospital Refusal  to  Release Mental Patients, 9
CrvE-MAR.  L. Rxv. 220  (1960)  in which the author
urges fuller recognition in release cases that the hospital
play a role of protecting  society  against the patients;
this often conflicts with their role as therapists.
44 H. R. Re. No. 892, 84th Cong, 1st Sess. 13  (1955).
41Statistics  do  not support this: The popular notion
that the psychiatrist  wishes  to see the offender  turned
loose upon society is far from the truth; many of those
who are released at the expiration  of sentence he would
urge  as  candidates  for  prolonged  segregation.  Over-
holser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal  Law, 16
B.U.L.  R.v. 322,  326  (1936).
46  One  jurisdiction  has  abrogated  its  functions  to
The  standards  set  by  law  for  determining
whether or not to release the patient center on one
or both  of  two  theses:  (1) whether or not the  de-
fendant has recovered his sanity, and  (2)  whether
or not he is still a danger  to himself or to others.
The particular  statutory  formulations  concerning
the "sanity"  theme vary."  Some  ask whether the
patient is any longer mentally ill, or if the patient
is cured and restored to sanity. Others ask whether
he  is  "entirely  and  permanently  recovered"  or
whether  he  has  recovered  "sufficiently...  to  be
released."  Whatever the formulae, the statutes are
usually broad  enough  to  allow  administrators  to
consider  the  problems  of  public  safety  before
granting  outright  release.  Reviewing  courts  have
little  choice but to follow the administrator's  de-
termination.  The patient's real  mental  condition
can  easily  be lost by  the fear of potential  crimi-
nality.
Other statutes do not refer to "sanity"  or to the
mental  condition  of the patient. These  ask  only
whether  continued  detention  is necessary  for the
safety  of the patient  or the public.4  The patient
who is not dangerous  is to be released,  though he
may be mentally  ill. These jurisdictions are more
concerned  with preventive  detention  than thera-
peutic assistance."
The  concept of "dangerous  behavior" is ambig-
uous. The problem still remains of ascertaining and
evaluating the process by which the crucial phrase
"dangerous  to  himself  or  others"  is  to  be given
meaning.  The  issue  arises both in hearings  to re-
view  applications  for  release  submitted  by  the
mental hospitals, and in habeas corpus proceedings
doctors in favor of medicine and has made the issue of
discharge  a  matter  for  psychiatric  definition.  The
District of Columbia  provides for release if the super-
intendent  certifies  (1) that such person  has recovered
his sanity (2) that, in the opinion of the superintendent,
such person  will not in  the reasonable  future  be dan-
gerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the
superintendent,  the person is  entitled  to his  uncondi-
tional release...  24 D.C.  CODE  ANN.  § 301  (e) (Supp.
VIII,  1960).  See  Overholser  v. Russell,  283  F.2d  195,
197 (D.C.  Cir. 1960).
47See e.g.,  CAnT.  P  xALu  CODE  ANaN.  § 1026  (1956);
CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  §  54-37  (1958);  IND.  STAT.  ANN.
§ 9-1704  (1966);  Mc.  Rxv.  STAT.  § 28-967  (1965-
Supp.);  N. J.  STAT.  2A:  163-3  (1953);  W.  VA.  ConE
§ 27-6-8 (1966).
sSee  e.g.,  DEL.  CODE  11-  § 4702(c)  (1966  Supp.);
MxE.  R1v.  STAT.  ANN.  15-  § 104  (1964);  N.Y. CODE
Cs.  PRoc.  § 454  (2)  (3)  (1966  Supp.);  N.C.  GE.
STAT.  ANN.  § 122.86 (1950).
49See  generally Goldstein  and  Katz,  Dangerousness
and Mental Illness,  70  YALE  L.J.  225  (1960);  Over-
holser,  The  Present Status of Release of Patients  froin
Mental Hospitals, 29  PsycmA.c  QuARUExRL  372-80
(1955).
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in which  the  patient petitions  for his  release.  It
has been suggested that dangerous behavior might
be construed to include:
(1) only  the crime for which the insanity  defense
was  successfully  raised;  (2) all  crimes;  (3) only
felonious  crimes  (as  opposed  to  misdemeanors);
(4)  only crimes for  which a given maximum  sen-
tence or more is authorized;  (5) only  crimes cate-
gorized  as violent;  (6)  only crimes  categorized  as
violent,  harmful,  physical,...  or  irreparable  to
victim;  (7) any  conduct,  even  if  not  labelled  as
criminal,  categorized  as  violent,  harmful,  or
threatening;  (8) any conduct  which may produce
violent  retaliatory  acts...;  (9)  any  physical
violence to oneself; (10)  any combination of these.'
0
Despite the variety of possible  meanings  which
may be given to  the word  "dangerous,"  only the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
addressed itself to the matter in any detail. 0 1 Judge
Fahy,  concurring  in Ragsdale v.  Overholser,0 sug-
gests  that the  question  of  dangerousness  should
turn upon the nature of the offense with which the
defendant was originally charged.  Under this view,
continued  confinement would  depend  on  whether
release posed "a danger comparable to the serious-
ness of the offense  of which the  committed person
was acquitted and if that offense is of a non-violent
character, a more lenient approach to the question
of danger  is in order."  r Judge Fahy does not ad-
dress himself to the situation where the patient was
originally convicted  of a minor offense  and is now
likely to commit a more serious  crime. In Overhol-
ser v.  Russell,'- the  court  rejected  Judge  Fahy's
suggestion:
The danger  to  the public need  not be possible
physical violence or a crime of violence. It is enough
if there is competent evidence that he may commit
any criminal act, for any such act will injure others
and will expose the person to arrest, trial, and con-
viction.  There  is  always  the  additional  possible
danger-not  to  be  discounted  even  if  remote-
that a nonviolent criminal act may expose the per-
petrator to violent retaliatory acts by the victim of
the crime."
0 Goldstein and Katz, supra note 49,  at 235.
"Even  the  MODEL  PENAL  CODE,  which  uses  the
concept  in its section on release, fails to define it either
in  its  proposed  statute  or  in  the  comments.  A.L.I,
MODEL PENAL  CODE,  § 4.08  (Proposed  Official Draft,
1962).
281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Id. at 950.
283  F.2d 195  (D.C. Cir. 1960).
55  Id.  at  198.  Accord,  Overholser  v.  O'Beirne,  302
F.2d  852  (D.C.  Cir.  1962).  See statements supporting
A  third  type  of  statute  allows  release  only  if
the patient  is both sane and  not  dangerous.  The
patient  is  therefore  to  remain  in  custody  if  he
is  (a)  sane but  dangerous  or  (b) insane  but  not
dangerous. 51 The  wording  of  these  statutes  in-
vites  an  application  which  conflicts  with  their
therapeutic  purpose  and  seems  to  sanction  de-
tention  solely  for  "potential  dangerousness"  17
and  retribution.  "A  decision not  to release  solely
on the  basis of potential  dangerousness  would  be
like  a  decision not  to  discharge  a  tubercular pa-
tient-though  no longer infectious-because  he  is
a potential killer or check forger."  -
Finally,  some  states  make  release  dependent
upon proof  of either  sanity  or lack  of dangerous-
ness.  A  dangerous  person  can compel his  release,
provided he is sane; an insane one may win release
if he is not dangerous.5" Such statutes are based on
the  assumption  that only patients  who  are  both
dangerous  and insane should be subjected  to con-
tinued confinement.
In two  thirds  of the states there are provisions
for releasing  the patient conditionally,  in accord-
ance  with  procedures  similar  to  those  set  forth
above."0  This  device"l  makes  it  unnecessary  to
Judge  Fahy,  Judge Bazelon,  concurring  in  Oberholser
v.  Russell,  283  F.2d  at  199;  and  Judge  Edgerton,
dissenting in Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d at 862.
66  See e.g., WIs. STAT.  § 957.11  (4) (1957);  R.L  GEN.
STAT.  § 26-4-7 (1956).
17  See In re Williams,  157 F. Supp.  871,  876 (D.D.C.
1958) where the court specifically rejected a "potentially
dangerous"  test  to hold  patients:  Many persons  who
are released  to society upon completing the service of
sentences  in criminal cases  are just as surely potential
menaces  to  society  as is  this  petitioner,  ...  yet  the
courts have no legal basis  of ordering  their continued
confinement  or  mere  apprehension  of future  unlawful
acts, and must wait until another crime against society
is committed or they are found insane in proper mental
health  proceedings  before  confinement  may  again  be
ordered.
"Goldstein  and Katz, supra note 49 at  238.
"See  e.g.,  KA-s.  GEN.  STAT.  §  62-1532  (1949);
MImI. STAT.  §  631.19  (1957);  VT.  STAT.  AoNN.  13-
§ 4812;  WASH.  RIv.  CODE  § 10.76.070  (1966  Cum.
Supp.).
"See  text notes 34-42. 6,Also  called conditional discharge, parole, furlough,
leave of absence, probation or convalescent leave. Some
states  have  provisions  which  expressly  make  such
release available to patients committed after an acquit-
tal by reason  of insanity,  e.g.,  CAir..  WE.ry.  & INST.
CODE  § 6761b  (1966);  Omo Rxv. CODE AwN.  § 2945.39
(1953).  Most states merely  extend to such patients the
provisions applicable to all mental patients, e.g.,  KANs.
GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 62-1532  (1949);  TEE.  CODE  CIm.
Pnoc. Art. 46.02 (1966).  A small number of states leave
the matter to the discretion of the trial judge, e.g.,  FLA.
STAT.  ANox.  § 919.11  (1960).  In some states, the crimi-
nally  insane  are  specifically  barred  from  conditional
release,  e.g.,  CoNs.  GEN.  STAT.  § 17-198  (Supp. 1966);
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determine  the  "completeness"  or  the  "perma-
nence"  of  the patient's  recovery  from  mental ill-
ness."  Furthermore,  the  problems  of  "potential
dangerousness"  are provided for by the imposition
of  conditions  on  the  "parolee's"  freedom."  The
difficult  decision to release  therefore  becomes less
critical while the patient is also given a chance to
adjust to life outside the hospital."4
The  standards  for  conditional  release  are  no
more defined than those found for outright release.
Some use "public safety" as a criterion for release.
Others  authorize release  if  the  patient  is  "im-
proved"  or  if  it  will serve  his "best  interest."  61
Whatever  the standard used, conditional release is
a  recommended  procedure  for  "the  purpose  of
providing the patient with  the rehabilitative  sup-
port  which  is  considered  psychiatrically  indica-
ted."  66
In virtually  all  jurisdictions,  the  patient  who
wishes to challenge his continued detention has the
burden of persuading the court that he should be
released."  From  the  viewpoint  of public  protec-
tion, "where insanity has gone so far as actually to
take human life, no sensible person will be satisfied
with evidence of recovery which does not attain to
the  degree  of reasonable  certainty."  68  The  ever
present  concern  for  public  safety  thus  requires
that a heavier  burden-known  as  the  "total-re-
covery"  test-be imposed on the criminally insane
to meet the standards of release than that imposed
on the mentally ill patient.  The "total-recovery"
test is based on the theory that public protection
Ky. REV.  STAT.  § 202.370  (1960).  See also the recom-
mendations for conditional release in the MODEL PENAL
CODE,  §  4.08.
62  See text supra  notes 69-78.
6E.g.,  California  provides  that  the  "parolees"
submit themselves  to regular psychiatric studies.
"It  is considered  therapeutically  desirable for the
patient to return to the community as quickly as pos-
sible in order  to  avoid  the risks  of dependence  upon
too  protected  an  environment.  See  generally  JonT
C  MMSSION  ON MENTAL ILNEss AND  HEALE., ACTION
ToR  MENTAL  HEALTR  (1961).
61  Illustrative of the standards are the following:  (1)
Public  safety-ALA.  CODE  § 45-219  (1959);  CAm'.
WELT.  & INST.  CODE  § 676Ib (1954);  (2)  Improved-
ARiz.  REv. STAT.  ANN.  § 36-524(A)  (Supp.  1966);  (3)
Best interest-GA.  CODE.  ANN.  88-1612(a)  (1963);  (4)
No standard-Cow. REV.  STAT. ANN.  §  39-8-4 (3) (1963).
See generally  LrND  N AN McINT  ,  m  MENTALLY
DisABuL  Am  THE  LAw 124-125, 362  (1961).
11  Hough v. United  States, 271  F.2d 458, 460  (D.C.
Cir. 1959).  Compare  with the text note 43.
6Pennsylvania seems to be the only state where the
burden is on those restraining  the person to prove his
insanity. PA.  STAT.  tit. 50, § 1482.
"Barry  v. White,  62 App. D.C. 69,  71,  64 F.2d 707,
709  (1933)  quoting Thaw v. Lamb, 118 N.Y. Supp. 389,
392 (1909).
must rate  above the patient's  chances for cure. It
has been criticized for equating commitment with
a prison sentence and thereby defeating "both  the
jury's acquittal and the medical profession's efforts
at  rehabilitation."  69  In  the  leading  case  which
applied  it, a federal  district  court rejected  as in-
sufficient  psychiatric  certification  that  the  peti-
tioner had "recovered  sufficiently,"  and held that
this did not comply with the statute since a suffi-
cient  recovery  may  be partial  and  not  totalY0
This test imposes  an  almost  impossible  question
for  certifying  psychiatristsn  and,  paradoxically,
may have  done the very thing the law was  trying
to avoid-place the ultimate determination in their
handsY 2
Another  test, known  as  the  "no-possibility-of-
relapse"  test, poses an equally difficult task for the
certifying  psychiatrist7  and could  mean  that the
patient would continue in confinement after he has
recovered  his  sanity.4  Such  a test has  even  been
69  Some  courts  follow  the  theory  of  imposing  no
heavier  burden  than they  would  upon any  mentally
ill patient. See In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C.
1957)  where such a pronouncement was made although
the patient was denied release. But see Ex park Dubina,
311 Mich. 482,  484,  18 N.W.2d 902,  904  (1945)  where
a stronger  showing is required  as to  the restoration of
sanity of a  person who  was  committed to  an asylum
after being acquitted in a case involving homicide than
in the case  of  an alleged incompetent  who  has never
been  convicted  or  charged  with  a crime;"  Ex  parle
Palmer, 26 R.I. 486, 492,  59 A.  746, 752 (1904)  where
because the court was  charged with the  high duty of
protecting  the  public  from  irresponsible  persons,  to
warrant  a discharge,  the  petitioner  must  show by  a
clear  and strong preponderance of evidence that he was
not insane, a  standard, it was noted,  not required  for
the  release  of persons in  insane asylums.  See also Ex
parle Remus,  119 Ohio St. 166,  168,  162 N.E.  740, 742
(1928)  requiring  "reasonable  certainty  that  the pa-
tient's release would be without  menace to the public
peace."  Note, 68 YALE  L.J. 293, 301 (1958). 70  In  re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1957). 71 Indeed psychiatrists might be forced into certifying
evasive reports in order to prevent continued detention
and  to  avoid  the  possible  psychological  harm  to  a
rehabilitated  patient  which the  denial  of a  discharge
might  cause. Note, 68 YALE L.J.  293,  299  (1958).
72 Consider the compromise in Minnesota where the
"total recovery"  test is retained but the judge is allowed
some  discretion.  It  requires  that  the  patient  be
"1...  wholly recovered..."  but provides  that if he does
not qualify under  that standard the  court may cofdi-
tionally  discharge  him if it  finds  "...  that no person
will be endangered  by his release on parole, ... , and a
proper and suitable person is willing to take such com-
mitted  person  on  parole...."  MINN.  STAT.  ANN.
§ 631.19  (Supp.  1966). 73 "It  is  not  possible  for a  psychiatrist  to  certify
that any patient is permanently recovered,  since there
is always the possibility of another psychotic reaction."
Note, 68 YA  L.J.  293,  325 (1958).
7"He should  be  kept  under  observation  in  the
institute for  a  sufficiently  long  period,  even  after  a
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held  to  authorize  the  confinement  of  "sane  per-
sons."  71  This  does  not  seem  justified  under  any
regular commitment statute. Under it, the patient
would be unable to obtain release until capable  of
sustaining  the extremely  heavy burden of satisfy-
ing the court that even though he is "cured,"  there
is  also no  possibility that he will suffer a relapse.
The criminally insane patient finds himself a mem-
ber  of  an  "exceptional  class"  of "guilty  persons"
who  should not go "unwhipped  of justice."  76
The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia has rendered  several opinions which typify the
undercurrents  of  suspicion  and  doubt  running
through  release  proceedings.  Once  the  hospital
superintendant or administrator  refuses to issue a
release  certificate,  the  petitioner  must  persuade
the  court  that  such  action  was  "arbitrary  and
capricious."  The  patient  must  show  more  than
mere improvement. "If an abnormal mental condi-
tion  renders  him  potentially  dangerous,  reason-
able...  doubts are to be resolved  in favor  of the
public."  77 This  requirement  of  "proof  beyond  a
reasonable doubt" exists even though a mandatory
commitment comes as a result not of a finding that
the defendant  was insane but only that there was
reasonable doubt as to his sanity.78
Using the court's  power to reject a petition for
release as  an instrument  of protection is not only
inconsistent  with  the  theory  that  the  criminally
insane are not guilty of any crime, but it represents
an  abuse  of  discretion  and  frustrates  one  of the
chief  purposes  of  commitment,  i.e.,  rehabilita-
tion. 7 9  Yet  it  has  been  judicially  defended  as  a
means  of preventing  "a plea  of insanity from  be-
coming an escape route from the consequences  of a
criminal conviction by substituting a short stay in
cure  appears,  in  order  to  make  certain  that  the  ap-
parent cure  is not merely temporary, or as is known in
psychiatry,  a  period  of  remission."  In  re Rosenfield,
157 F. Supp.  18,  20 (D.D.C.  1957).
75 Gleason  v.  West  Boylston,  136  Mass.  489,  491
(1884). 76 Application  of Perkins,  165  Cal.  App.  2d  73,  76,
331 P.2d  712, 715  (1958).
7  Ragsdale v. Overholser,  281  F.2d  943,  947  (D.C.
Cir. 1960);  Overholser v. Lynch, 257  F.2d 667,  669-670
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
71'  Orencia  v.  Overholser,  163  F.2d  763  (D.C.  Cir.
1951); Barry v. White, 64 F.2d 707 (D.C.  Cir. 1933).
7  "The failure  to grant discharge to a patient when
he has recovered and it is deemed medically admissible,
could  quite  conceivably  interfere  with  the  patient's
rehabilitation."  Note,  supra  note  73,  at  299  n.32.
Compare to Judge Holtzoff's statement in In  re Rosen-
field,  157 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1957),  on thepurposes
of commitment: "It is obvious that the Congress  had a
two-fold  purpose:  first,  to  protect  the  public;  and
second,  to discourage  unfounded pleas of insanity."
a modern mental  hospital  for a long  term  of  im-
prisonment..  . ."  80
The problem raised  by  (1) the strict burden  of
proof requirement,  (2)  the vague statutory  stand-
ards for release, and  (3) the ease  with which  com-
mitment  of  the  defendant  is  attained,  is  that
indeterminate commitment  may  in  reality become
preventive detention.  Distrust  for  the  insane  de-
fendant  who  has  been  acquitted  tends  to  evoke
considerations  of  blame  and  punishment  rather
than therapeutic  concerns.  The  insanity defense,
rather  than  becoming dispositive  of  the issues  of
blame and punishment, seeks to detain indefinitely
for  the  supposed  benefit  of  the patient  and  soci-
ety.
The situation is posed most dearly by the per-
son  who  cannot  be  "cured  by  present  medical
knowledge." 8'  For  him,  acquittal  by  reason  of
insanity may bring with  it  a period  of detention
far  in  excess  of  his potential  criminal  sentence.
This  may  occur  because  he  cannot  satisfy  the
standards for release.  The rationale for  such inde-
terminate detention is summarized in Overholser v.
Lynch:
Frederick  Lynch's  confinement  was  not  re-
stricted  to  a period  measured by a  criminal  sen-
tence because by  its very nature, hospitalization,
to  be  effective,  must  be initially  for an indeter-
minate  period ...  and  since  hospitalization  is
remedial  whereas  a  jail  sentence  is  punitive..
further  consideration  of the  criminal  penalty...
becomes  irrelevant,  for  any  and  all  purpoes.n
The heart of the problem  of indeterminate  de-
tention seems to be the patient's potential danger-
ousness and  his  need for care. Detention beyond
the limits fixed by the criminal code for the "crime"
committed  can be justified  only if such detention
will serve the patient's  welfare  (his need for care)
and  social welfare  (protection from probable  dan-
8 0 In re  Rosenfield,  157  F. Supp.  18,  20  (D.D.C.
1957).
81See  Rouse  v. Cameron,  373  F.2d  451  (D.C.  Cir.
1966) where the court accords the detained the right to
the  most  adequate  treatment  available;  Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1966);  Woar=,
THE  CormxeoRAR  PsYcHoTHPAPjsss  ExA NE
THEmsELvEs  15,  21,  95  (1956);  Oberndorf,  Unsatisfac-
tory  Results  of  Psychoanalytic Therapy,  19  PsvcHo-
AN-ALYTIC  Q 393  (1950).
82 Overholser  v.  Lynch,  288  F.2d  388,  393-394
(D.C.  Cir.  1961).  If the  detention  is "therapeutic"  in
its  objectives  it  is  assumed  it  may  be  indefinite  in
duration. If punitive, it must have limits. The underly-
ing assumption  seems to  be that  there is no  need  to
fear excess from  a medical  disposition, but only from a
criminal one.
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ger).83 The welfare  of the patient will be served if
he will be  successfully "cured."  If  the patient  is
untreatable, society can only benefit from his  con-
tinued  commitment.  So  that the  "incurable"  pa-
tient will not be allowed  to perpetrate his act of
violence  on society  again, the needs  of the public
are always raised above  the rights  of the patient,
and indeterminable  detention  becomes  the  device
for achieving this end.
At present, the law of release is filled with short-
comings.  The  statutory  criteria  usually  treat all
persons  acquitted  by  reason  of  insanity  in  the
same fashion. The law is aimed at detaining mad-
men who commit  acts of outrage. Yet, the power
to detain indefinitely  is  exercisable  regardless  of
the  type  of  offense  originally  charged  and  the
probability  of a recurrence  of  the  offensive  act.U
Furthermore,  the present  laws  of  release  fail  to
balance, the  probabilities  of  danger  against  the
economic,  social,  and medical benefits  which may
result from setting the patient free.85
Two possible solutions to the problems of indefi-
nite  detention  have  been  suggested. 8  The  first
would  limit  the  offender's  commitment  to  the
maximum possible sentence he would  serve if not
acquitted by reason of insanity. If he is to be con-
fined  any longer  it  must be  because  he is  civilly
committable. The criteria for release after the max-
imum sentence expires become  that required of all
mentally1 l  patients. The distinction between  the
criminally  insane and the mentally ill is not car-
ried beyond the maximum criminal period of con-
finement. §ociety's refusal to permit release at this
time would be arguably violative of due process.
The second would  treat the patient as "acquit-
ted" and.require  the state to initiate civil commit-
ment proceedings immediately. Like the first pro-
posal,  the  civil commitment process  becomes  the
means by which the  rights of the patient are pro-
tected.  Hopefully "dangerousness"  will be defined
and commitment will persist only as long as thera-
peutically necessary.
83  See  generally Waelder,  Psychiatry and the Problem
of Criminal  Responsibility, 101 U.  PA. L. REv. 378, 389
(1952).
" See Note, Logical Analysis of Criminal  Responsibil-
ity  and Mandatory Commitment,  70  YATE  L.J.  1354
(1961)  where the probabilities of the illegal act recurring
are viewed mathematically. 85Consider in this respect the economic  contribution
the patient may make to  society, and  the social  con-
tribution  to his wife and family. His release  may also
facilitate his cure. 81  See Note, supra n.64 at 1364. See generally Morris,
Impedfnents to Penal Reform, 33  U. Cm.  L. R~v.  627
(1966);'  Goldstein  and  Katz,  Abolish the Insanity De-
fense-Why Not? 72 Y=  L.J. 853, 872-876 (1963).
Civil commitment  procedures  do  solve  some of
the  difficulties  inherent  in present  indefinite  de-
tention. The detention problem  is considered  at a
separate  proceeding  apart  from  the  one  which
focused  upon  criminal  responsibility.  Moreover,
the burden is put on the state to prove the patient
will  commit crimes rather than on the patient  to
prove he will nbt. In other words,  the  burden  of
proof shifts from  the patient to  the state to  show
that further detention is necessary.7
The substantive law  of civil commitment,  how-
ever, provides  little help  in solving  the detention
impasse,  especially on the issue  of "probable  dan-
ger."  Statutes on this point range from notions  of
"mental  illness"  and "public danger,"  to whether,
the patient is in "need  of  care and treatment,"  or,
"lacks  sufficient  insight"  to  make  his  own  deci-
sions. Because  of the complexity, of the "danger",
issue,  most  states  have  eliminated, it  from  their,
civil  commitment  statutes  and  have  substituted,
the  latter  mentioned  standards.  These  statutes.
therefore  mask  the important  concerns  of  social
policy, found in the criminal setting, behind osten-
sibly medical judgments."  "
Indeterminate  detention not only threatens  the
liberty of the individual, but also the very existence
of  the  defense  of  insanity.  The  possibility  of  a:
lengthy commitment  will cause  many defendants
and their counsel to consider the alternative crimi-
nal  conviction  path. At  least  there,  suspension,'
parole, probationary release, or good behavior will
act  in  a  relatively precise  way  to  cut down  the
sentence set by the court. The insanity defense  on'
the other hand carries with it the probability of a:
wholly indefinite  period  of  confinement.  Furtheri
more,  the  stigmatization  the  defendant  tries  to
avoid  by  asserting insanity  is  suffered  as  surely
when  committed  indefinitely to a mental institu-
tion as when confined to a prison cell. 9
87 See generally, Kittrie,  Compulsory  Mental Treat-
ment  and  the Requirements of 'Due Process', 21  Omo
ST.  L.J.  28  (1960);  Ross,  Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 57 McH. L. REv. 945  (1959);  Comment, Analysis
of Legal and Medical Considerations in Commitment  of
the Mentally Ill, 56 YA  L.J.  1178  (1947).
8 See a discussion of these statutes in detail in Ln-
AND McINTiRE,  THE  MENTALLY  DisABLED  AND
=HE  LAW 17, 44 (1961).
89 Of the total number of criminal acts committed,  a
relatively  small  proportion  are  detected.  An  even
smaller  proportion  of  offenders  are  formally  charged
with crime.  Of  those  charged,  some  ninety  per cent
plead guilty. Only a small number of the ten per cent
who  stand  trial  plead  the insanity  defense.  Acheson,
McDonal v. United States: The Durham Rule Redefined,
51  Gzo. L.J. 580 (1963);  Note, Guilty Plea  Bargaining,
112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 865  (1964).
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A lawyer will therefore avoid use of the insanity
defense, with its indeterminable  confinement prac-
tices,  until he  is  able to  predict  with  reasonable
accuracy  just what the prospect-of  release will be
following  its successful  assertion.  Until that time,
the parole policy for prisoners will be favored  over
the release  policy  for  the  insane  (except  possibly
in cases  of extremely long criminal sentences).90
PROPOSED  STATUTORY  SOLUTION
The following procedural  guarantee  would  con-
siderably improve pretrial predictability as to post-
trial disposition  of  the  insane  defendant.  Unfor-
tunately,  these proposals  still beg the question  of
defining  the  standards  for  commitment  and  re-
lease. Development along these lines can only come
through  the avenue of  case law. Hopefully, a pro-
cedural approach such as that suggested below will
cause  lawyers to move more confidently  into this
area.
Article I:  Commitment After  Acquittal By  Reason
of Insanity
(1)  Upon  acquittal  by reason  of  insanity,  the
offender  shall  be  diagnosed  for  the  purpose  of
determining  whether  he  is  currently  dangerous.
The burden of proof on this issue shall be upon the
state. If he is found to be currently dangerous,  the
court shall order him committed to a mental hospi-
tal. If  commitment  should  then  be  ordered,  the
offender's  period  of commitment  shall not  exceed
the  outer  limit  of  the  criminal  sentence  which
would have been imposed had he been convicted  of
the crime.
(2)  Commitment beyond the  outer period  shall
not be allowed  unless  it can  be  shown  that it is
highly  probable  that the  offender's  release  would
be  dangerous  to life  or  person  in  the reasonably
near future.
(3)  For  the above  class  of offenders,  the state,
every ninety days, shall be required to apply to a
court for renewal of the commitment. The patient
shall be represented by counsel at such a hearing.
90  Note also that a lawyer may take into account the
therapeutic  aspects of  the problem such  as where  his
client will get better treatment. See Diamond, Criminal
Responsibility of  the  Mentally Ill, 14  STAr.  L.  Rzv.
59,  85  (1961)  where the author says: I do not hesitate
to  say that  Vacaville  (California  correctional  prison)
provides  a  higher  standard  of  psychiatric  treatment
than does the corresponding hospital for the criminally
insane...  operated  by  the  Department  'of  Mental
Hygiene.
Article II: Treatment of the Criminally Insane
(1)  If  commitment  is  ordered  pursuant  to the
preceding  article,  the  patient  shall  immediately
undergo treatment  in an approved  mental institu-
tion with medically qualified  therapists.
(2)  The  object  of  such  treatment  shall  at  all
times  be  the  earliest  possible  release  of  the pa-
tient.
(3)  The patient shall be allowed  to petition the
court at regular intervals  if he  believes his  treat-
ment  is  not  following  the  direction  of  the pre-
ceding  article. The burden of showing  satisfactory
treatment will be on the state.
Article III: Conditional  Release
(1)  At any time during  the period  of commit-
ment, the patient, the hospital superintendent,  or
the court, on the advice of the board of examiners,
may petition  for  the patient's  release  subject  to
conditions the court may deem necessary.
(2)  A  conditional release  hearing  shall be held
every ninety days regardless whether such hearing
is  called  pursuant to  the preceding  section.  The
burden of proving that the patient is  eligible  for
such  a  release  shall  be  on  the  patient.  Such  a
hearing shall also provide the court with informa-
tion  regarding  the  patient's  treatment  and  care
while committed.
(3)  To  be  eligible  for  conditional  release,  the
patient  need  not prove  total  recovery.  The  pa-
tient must show  that his  conditional  release  will
not endanger  himself or those with whom he  will
come  into  contact.  The  patient  must  also  show
that conditional  release will aid his recovery.
Article IV: Unconditional  Release
(1)  Unconditional  release  shall  be  ordered  im-
mediately upon the patient's serving the period for
which he would have been confined by the criminal
sanction attaching to his act.
(2)  Beyond  that period,  the  state  must  show
that the patient's release would be highly danger-
ous  to the  public. The  state must  commence  re-
newal  proceedings  immediately  and  provide  for
curative plans which must be approved by a court-
appointed board.
(3)  A  patient  who  is unconditionally  released
from a commitment exceeding a period of one year
shall appear every ninety days for one year before
a court-appointed  board to determine  if there has
been  any  relapse.  If  the  patient  has  suffered  a
relapse,  the state  may  initiate  civil  commitment
proceedings.
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(4) At any  time  during  the patient's  commit-
ment, the patient, the superintendent of the insti-
tution, or  the court may petition  for an uncondi-
tional  release. 9 1  A hearing  shall  be  held and  the
burden  of showing  eligibility  for  release  shall  be
placed on the patient.
ALTERNATIVE  DEFENSES  FOR  THE  INSANE
DEFENDANT
The  fear  of  indeterminate  commitment  has
provoked  the  development  of alternatives  to  the
insanity  defense. If the defendant  refuses  to em-
ploy the insanity defense because  it may result in
his indeterminate  detention,  the conclusion would
seem to be that the issue of mental illness becomes
irrelevant.  However,  mental  illness  may  become
relevant to defenses other than insanity-defenses
which provide  a quite  different disposition  of the
insane  defendant  than  that which  was  outlined
above.
Doctrines other than the insanity defense which
offer  defense  counsel  the opportunity  to  use evi-
dence  of the defendant's  mental illness  appear in
two types  of cases:  (1)  those in  which  the subjec-
tive element of intent becomes the reason for reduc-
ing the degree of guilt and  the sentence  following
-principally  cases  involving  the  issue  of  pre-
meditation; and  (2) those which may lead to com-
plete acquittal-principally cases involving specific
intent, involuntary acts, and self-defense.12
Cases  falling  under  the  first  category  usually
involve  situations not quite  so  critical to  society
and  in  which  pressure  for  compassion  is  great,
such  as  homicides.  The  effort  to  escape  capital
punishment  leads  defendants  to  seek  reductions
from first degree murder  to second degree murder
or manslaughter.  One doctrine, known as "partial
responsibility,"  11  has become  the  focal  point  of
these efforts.
1 9 1  See supra,  note 66. See also SPECIAL  COMMITTEE TO
STUDY  COMMITMENT  PROcEDuREs,  MENTAL  ILLNEss
AND DUE  PROCESS,  19-39  (1962);  N.Y.  STAT.  ANN.
34A;  § 73,  74, 84 (Supp. 1966); English Mental Health
Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2., Ch. 72 §  43. Note that psychia-
try  must  keep  pace  with  any  proposed  procedural
guarantee for release. Presently, there are few  success-
ful methods  of treatment  and those available are very
expensive.  Case  law  will  find  itself hindered  by the
practical  slowness  inherent  in  psychiatric  treatment.
See  generally, Symposium on the Evaluation of  Thera-
peutic Results, 29 INTL.  J. PsYCHOANALYsIs  7 (1948).
9 See generally WErEOFEN, MENTAL  DISORDER  AS  A
CRIMINAL  DEFENSE  176  (1954).
9  See  generally Weihofen  and  Overholser,  Mental
Disorder  Affecting The Defense of a Crime, 56 YALE L.J.
959 (1947).
The  doctrine  of  partial  responsibility  had  its
origin in cases which  admitted  evidence of intoxi-
cation to negate the elements  of murder. 9 4 Today,
it exists in several  states to allow  introduction  of
evidence  of  mental  disease  to  prove  that a  de-
fendant  was  incapable  of  the premeditation  and
deliberation  required  for  first  degree  murder.9 5
In  England,  the  doctrine  known  as  "diminished
responsibility"  has  been  extended  by statute  to
reduce  murder  to  manslaughter. 96  The  doctrine's
function is to give the jury the opportunity to find
the defendant  less guilty than the reasonable man
and yet not force him to resort only to the insanity
defense  to introduce evidence of his mental illness.
The  defendant  facing  a  murder  charge  may  no
longer have  to  choose just between,  on  the  one
hand,  insanity  and  indeterminate  commitment
and, on the other, conviction and a long sentence.
The choice  can  be enlarged  to  include a possible
defense  of diminished responsibility. This plea has
become so popular that it threatens to displace the
insanity defense in England.Y
The theory underlying the partial responsibility
doctrine  is  that verdict  and  sentence  should  be
tied  more accurately  than in the past  to  the de-
fendant's  culpability.  Carried  to  its  logical  ex-
treme,  this permits  the mental  illness  to be  used
generally  to  negate  the intent  element  required
for any crime. Such  a defense  is  therefore poten-
tially more than a partial defense which  mitigates
penalty and retains the  offender  in custody for a
long time. The  doctrine may lead to releasing the
defendant  entirely in cases when evidence  of men-
tal disorder is used to negate mens rea in a crime
which  contains  no  lesser  offense.8  The  complete
acquittal  of  such  offenders  would  release  from
94Note,  Intoxication  as  a  Criminal Defense,  55
CoLuM.  L. REv.  1210,  1213 (1955).
96See supra note 5  and discussion  on "insanity"  as
evidence.  See generally Packer, Mens Rea and the Su-
preme Court, 1962 SUPEE  COURT REvmw 107; HALL,
CpssnAL LAw 72 (1965).
96  The English  provisions  are set  out in Prevenzer,
The English Homicide Act,  57  Cowum.  L.  R.v.  624,
636-637  (1957).  The statutory definition is such abnor-
mality  of  mind  (whether arising  from  a  condition  of
arrested  or  retarded  development  of  mind  or  any
inherent  causes  or induced  by  disease  or injury)  as
substantially impairs his mental responsibility.
97  See  Sparks,  Diminished Responsibility in Theory
and Practice, 27  MoD.  L. Rxv.  9,  31-32.  Under  the
English  practice,  a successful  plea  of  diminished  re-
sponsibility  may lead  either  to a reduced  sentence  or
to an order sending the offender to a hospital. See also
WAixER,  CRIME AN Pu  ismrmT ni Bl rAN, Ch.  13
(1965).
98  See supra, note 95.
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state control the very persons society should prob-
ably most fear.
The courts have  thus far been spared  the com-
plexities  of the  problem  because  the  insanity de-
fense has  also been  pleaded  and commitment  or-
dinarily  followed.  This protective  device may not
always be present. The state may be left entirely
to  the, civil  commitment  process  to  detain  the
offender if he is not subject  to mandatory or dis-
cretionary  commitment.  As a result, this doctrine
threatens to eliminate the insanity defense entirely
for it  offers  the offender  not only the  fullest  con-
sideration of his mental illness but also the immedi-
ate prospect  of freedom-at least until civil com-
mitment proceedings are begun.
There  are  two  other instances  (besides  specific
intent  crimes)  in  which  traditional  doctrine  per-
mits the insanity defense  to be circumvented  and
the mentally ill offender to win complete acquittal:
one  is  through  proof  that  the  offending  act  was
"involuntary";  the  other,  in  a -small  number  of
jurisdictions,  is through use of a subjective stand-
ard in. the defense of self-defense."9
Crime is generally defined as a composite  of two
elements: a voluntary act (actus reus) and a state
of mind  (mens  rea).  This view is  now codified  in
the  Model  Penal  Code  which  defines  crime  as
"conduct  which  includes  a  voluntary  act  or
...  omission"  and  then  sets  out  instances  of
behavior  which  are  not  voluntary  acts:  "(a)  a
reflex  or  'convulsion; (b)  conduct during hypnosis
or  resulting  from  hypnotic  suggestion.." 100  To-
day,  it  is probable  that  most  of  the  conditions
which  have  in  the  past  supported  a  defense  of
involuntary act would  also be able to support the
insanity defense.  The result, in practical terms, is
that the mentally ill offender has still another way
of placing his mental illness on the scales while at
the same time minimizing the risk of commitment
if he should prevail.  At present,  there  is  no pro-
9  See generally Fox, Physical  Disorder,  Consciousness,
and Criminal Liability, 63  CoLu-t.  L. Rav. 645  (1963).
10 0  A.L.I.,  MODEL  PENAL  CODE  §  2.01  (Proposed
Official Draft  1962).  For commentary, see Tent. Draft
No. 4, p. 119  (1955).
cedure  within  the  criminal  process  for retaining
in  custody  persons  acquitted  because  their  acts
were involuntary.
The law  of  self-defense  is  usually presented  to
the jury in two questions: (1) did the defendant  in
fact kill out of an honest fear of immediate  danger
to himself? (2)  was his belief reasonable under the
circumstances?  The  Model  Penal  Code  accepts
the first question  and  its subjective  standard  by
requiring  only  that  the  action  being  forced  "is
immediately necessary  for the  purpose  of protec-
ting himself."  I 0'  Under  such  a formula, it  is vir-
tually inevitable  that psychiatric  testimony  will
be  offered  and  received  on  the  question whether
the  defendant  was  genuinely  frightened  and
whether he used that degree of force which he be-
lieved to be "immediately  necessary."
If the  A.L.I.  approach  is  adopted, its  doctriie
of self-defense  will provide yet another avenue  for
the mentally ill to avoid the insanity defense  and
the risk  of commitment it entails.  In doing so,  it
may free persons  who respond  too soon  to threat-
ened danger, or who respond  disproportionately.
So  long  as  the insanity defense  remains  an al-
ternative  to  these  other  defenses  which  the  de-
fendant may  assert or not, as he  wishes, it is un-
reasonable  to  expect that very many  defendants
will use it. It  may become necessary,  therefore, to
develop  doctrines  that  will  once again  make  the
insanity defense  the  exclusive avenue for bringing
evidence  of mental illness  into the trial.1°2  Alter-
natively, it may  be  desirable  to fashion  commit-
ment  and release  precedures,  like those  discussed
above, for all mentally ill offenders. Neither inde-
terminate  detention nor  complete  acquittal  offer
absolute  approaches  to  the  disposition  of  the
criminally  insane. The  solution  may lie  in  some
kind  of partial responsibility coupled  with a stat-
utory procedure such as that suggested.
101 A  AL.I.,  MODEL  PENAL  CODE  §  304  (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).  For commentary, see Tent. Draft
No. 8, p. 14 (1958).
'02  See WILLIAmS,  Ta  MENTAL  ELEMENT  IN  Cn
111-15 (1965).
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